When Is an Insured Event Intentionally Caused under Belgian Insurance Law?

“Intentional loss is not insured.”

This is a commonly used summary of a fundamental principle of Belgian insurance law. Article 62, first paragraph, of the Belgian Insurance Act provides that an insurer cannot be required to provide cover to a person who intentionally caused the insured event.

The rule appears straightforward. Its application is considerably less so.

An insured may consciously engage in dangerous conduct without intending to cause damage. Conversely, the insured may intend to cause damage, but not the precise damage that ultimately occurs. The insured’s underlying motive does not necessarily coincide with the intention to cause damage either.

In a judgment of 15 January 2026, the Belgian Court of Cassation again clarified when an insured event is intentionally caused within the meaning of Article 62 of the Belgian Insurance Act.

In brief

  • A conscious or voluntary act is not sufficient in itself.
  • The insured must have voluntarily and consciously intended to cause damage.
  • The insured does not need to have intended the precise nature or full extent of the damage.
  • The insured’s motive must be distinguished from the intention to cause damage.
  • Consciously dangerous or reckless conduct without an intention to cause damage does not constitute intent for insurance-law purposes.

What does Article 62 of the Belgian Insurance Act provide?

Article 62, first paragraph, of the Belgian Insurance Act provides that, notwithstanding any clause to the contrary, an insurer cannot be required to provide cover to a person who intentionally caused the insured event.

An insured cannot transfer the financial consequences of an insured event that he or she intentionally caused to the insurer.

The provision is personal in nature. It applies to the person who intentionally caused the insured event.

What does “intentionally caused” mean?

The Belgian Insurance Act does not contain a separate definition of intent. The concept has therefore largely been developed through the case law of the Belgian Court of Cassation.

According to the current case law, it is necessary, but sufficient, that through an act or omission the insured voluntarily and consciously intended to cause damage.

A distinction must therefore be drawn between two different intentions:

  1. the intention to perform a particular act; and
  2. the intention to cause damage through that act.

Only the second intention constitutes intent for insurance-law purposes.

The fact that a person knowingly speeds, drives through a red light, disregards a safety rule or engages in other dangerous conduct does not prove that the person also intended to cause damage. The conduct may be particularly reckless or seriously negligent, but it is not necessarily intentional.

The judgment of 15 January 2026

The case concerned a fire in rented property.

On 19 January 2017, a fire broke out in a property rented by the insured. The owner’s fire insurer compensated the owner for the damage to the building and was subsequently subrogated to the owner’s rights. The insurer sought recovery of its expenditure from the tenant.

The tenant, in turn, argued that the same insurer was required to indemnify him under his tenant’s liability insurance.

The insurer refused cover, arguing that the tenant had intentionally started the fire.

The tenant admitted that he had started the fire himself. He stated, however, that he had done so in an attempt to end his own life.

The Court of Appeal found that the fire had been started deliberately, but held that it had not been established that the tenant intended to cause damage resulting from the materialisation of a risk covered by the insurance contract. According to the Court of Appeal, his intention concerned his own death rather than damage to the building.

The Court of Cassation set that decision aside.

The decision of the Court of Cassation

The Court of Cassation first repeated the applicable legal rule:

For the insurer to be released from providing cover, it is necessary, but sufficient, that through an act or omission the insured voluntarily and consciously intended to cause damage.

The Court added two important clarifications.

First, the insured does not need to have intended the precise nature or full extent of the insured event.

Second, the fact that the insured starts a fire with the intention of committing suicide does not prevent the insured event from having been caused intentionally.

The Court of Appeal could therefore not lawfully conclude that there was no intent for insurance-law purposes while at the same time finding that the tenant had deliberately started the fire.

The Court of Cassation referred this part of the case to the Antwerp Court of Appeal.

Motive is not the same as intention

The principal practical lesson from the judgment is the distinction between the insured’s motive and the insured’s intention to cause damage.

The motive explains why the insured acted.

The intention concerns what the insured sought to bring about through the conduct.

In the case under consideration, the intention to commit suicide was the motive for starting the fire. That motive did not necessarily alter the fact that, by deliberately starting the fire, the insured also voluntarily intended to cause damage.

The assessment cannot therefore end with the underlying reason for the conduct. It must also examine which consequences the insured voluntarily and consciously intended to bring about through the specific act.

Must the insured have intended the precise damage?

No.

The insured must have intended to cause damage, but does not necessarily need to have foreseen or intended every consequence of the conduct.

In the case of deliberate arson, for example, the insured does not need to have:

  • foreseen the precise spread of the fire;
  • specifically targeted every item that was damaged;
  • been able to estimate the exact financial loss;
  • intended the full extent of the fire and smoke damage.

The fact that the ultimate damage is greater, more serious or different from what the insured expected does not automatically exclude intent.

It must nevertheless always be established that the insured intended to cause at least some damage. The conscious materialisation of a risk without an intention to cause damage is not sufficient.

What does not constitute intent under insurance law?

The following circumstances are not sufficient in themselves:

  • the insured consciously performed a dangerous act;
  • the insured knew that damage was possible;
  • the damage was reasonably foreseeable;
  • the insured took a particularly serious or unjustified risk;
  • the insured acted recklessly or carelessly.

Without an intention to cause damage, there is no intent within the meaning of Article 62 of the Belgian Insurance Act.

Such conduct may amount to gross negligence. Gross negligence and intent are, however, distinct concepts and are subject to different rules on insurance cover.

Practical significance of the judgment

The judgment of 15 January 2026 is relevant to both insurers and insured persons.

For insurers, it confirms that the insured does not need to have intended the exact nature or extent of the damage. A refusal of cover cannot therefore be defeated merely by arguing that the damage was more extensive than the insured had anticipated.

For insured persons, the judgment simultaneously confirms that a consciously performed act is not automatically sufficient. There must be an intention to cause damage.

For the courts, this means that a concrete assessment must be made of the insured’s state of mind and intention at the time of the events. A distinction must be drawn between:

  • the conscious act;
  • the underlying motive;
  • the intention to cause damage; and
  • the nature and extent of the damage that ultimately occurred.

Conclusion

Intent under Belgian insurance law exists where, through an act or omission, the insured voluntarily and consciously intended to cause damage.

It is not sufficient that the insured consciously engaged in dangerous or reckless conduct. The intention to cause damage remains the essential criterion.

The insured does not, however, need to have intended the precise nature or full extent of the damage. A different underlying motive, such as the intention to end one’s own life, does not necessarily exclude the intentional nature of the insured event.

The judgment of 15 January 2026 therefore confirms that intent under insurance law is determined not only by the reason why the insured acted, but above all by the damage that the insured voluntarily and consciously intended to cause through the specific conduct.

Frequently asked questions

Does every consciously performed act constitute an intentional insured event?

No. It must be established that the insured not only acted consciously, but also intended to cause damage.

Must the insured have intended the full extent of the damage?

No. The insured does not need to have intended the precise nature or full extent of the insured event.

Is foreseeable damage automatically intentional damage?

No. Damage may be foreseeable without having been intended. Foreseeability may indicate negligence or gross negligence, but it is not sufficient to establish intent.

Does a suicide attempt exclude intent under insurance law?

No. According to the Court of Cassation, the fact that an insured starts a fire with the intention of committing suicide does not prevent the insured event from having been caused intentionally.

Sources

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Jeffrey Amankwah

Jeffrey Amankwah is a lawyer at the Limburg Bar, focusing on insurance law, liability law and personal injury. He is a voluntary research associate at KU Leuven and regularly publishes and lectures on current developments in insurance and liability law.

About Jeffrey Amankwah